The Electoral Dilemma of the Social Movements in Ecuador

Raul Zibechi
translation por El Kilombo Intergalactico

The Indigenous and Popular movement in Ecuador, which in the last decade has taken down three governments and has risen to power through the electoral presidency of Lucio Gutierrez, now faces up to the dilemma of how to position itself in the face of upcoming elections in October. This is not some abstract ideological debate, but rather a very concrete accounting by the CONAIE of fifteen years of uprisings and of their participation in state institutions.

At a recent series of disccusions titled Indigenous Movements, Resistance and Alternative Projects, that took place in La Paz and El Alto (Bolivia), the question of the relation between movements and the new progressive and leftists governments, as well as the debate regarding the relation between social struggle and institutions, took center stage. The Ecuadorian experience and the current mobilizations against the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas were presented by; Miguel Guatemal, organizational secretary of the CONAIE and Pablo Davalos, advisor to this same indigenous organization. Their point of departure was a consideration of the fact that in the key historical moments of the recent past, the movement “triumphs and at the same time is defeated.” In other words, “it obtains triumphs that help to mask defeats.”

Davalos recounted that in 1998 the movement achieved the resignation of then president Abdala Bucaram, which opened a path to a constituent assembly, an assembly that then declared Ecuador a multinational country. But this triumph was quickly turned into a defeat by the bourgeoisie, “who were able to re-impose a liberal representative system”-- a system that in the name of governability minimized the potential for social mobilization. In other words, the recognition of the collective rights of the indigenous peoples did not change the foundations of the Ecuadorian state.

In January of 2000 the powerful “Indigenous and Popular Movement” forced Jamil Mahuad to leave office, but it was not able to impede the dollarization of the Ecuadorian economy—a fact that allowed Davalos to conclude that this was another instance in which, “triumph that masked a defeat.”

In the elections of 2002 the CONAIE supported Lucio Gutierrez who was finally victorious after a second electoral round. The results were similar; the new president quickly began to cut his ties to the various social movements and simultaneously looked to destroy them—a goal he came very close to achieving. Again, according to Davalos, “the indigenous movement ran up against the brick wall of liberalism.”

Through the cooperation and development plans designed by the World Bank, Gutierrez’s government sought to isolate and co-opt entire sectors of the indigenous movement. This method was particularly directed toward the Amazon region where Gutierrez was in fact able to divide its social organization. Despite having won the presidential elections, occupied various ministerial posts and state bodies, as well as obtaining an significant number of seats in the Ecuadorian parliament, the CONAIE now concludes, “we were never weaker than when we occupied the seat of government.”
After six months of Gutierrez’s rule the CONAIE decided to leave his government and join the opposition. Meanwhile at the end of 2004 after a truly historic organizational congress the CONAIE was able to avoid an immanent split by electing Luis Macas, an indigenous leader from the “sierra” with a long history of struggle, as their president. With their new president the CONAIE was able to begin a slow process of rcomposition that has since the beginning of 2005 allowed the CONAIE to once again become the decisive social and political actor in Ecuador.

How the CONAIE could fallen into a situation of such extreme weakness and vulnerability that it almost meant its complete disappearance is still a question that is being asked by its own leadership as well as by many political movements around the continent. “We had thought that winning elections was the key for social change, but that is just liberalism”—said Davalos in La Paz. But he went a step further, “It is liberalism that up until now has defined our epistemological framework and this has led us to place our emancipatory practices within the language of liberalism” and this can not be understated because, “liberal discourse can function only to demoblize and delegitimate [the movement].”

Throughout 2005 the leadership of the CONAIE returned to its community base, which despite the offensive unleashed by the state maintained its solidity throughout. During this time the CONAIE held over 200 workshops on the issue of the Free Trade Agreeement of the Americas (Macas himself participated in over 150 of these) with its base. Due to these workshops and the fact that the entirety of its leadership had returned to its base, the CONAIE disappeared from view within the Ecuadorian political spectrum. This mediatic disappearing act allowed the CONAIE to remake itself completely from below. Already as of November of 2005 the movement began reappear with a strong march of over 10,000 indigenous people to Quito, and again in March of this year they begin the long and strenuous process of coordinating an uprising against the Free Trade Agreements of the Americas that, just as had occurred since the first such uprising in 1990, has been capable of completely changing the relations of force on the national scene. The conclusion to this battle remains unknown, but what is known is that the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas will have to contend with an extremely powerful indigenous movement.

It is once again an electoral year in Ecuador and Davalos attempts to capture the CONAIE’s experience since it formed the “Movimiento Pachakutik” in the attempt to participate in state institutions with the following statement, “Lets say we participate in the elections and Luis Macas [the CONAIE president] wins. Isn’t the same thing going to happen that is happening in Bolivia? The organizational body of our movement all of a sudden becomes the social base for the State and our base then begins to legitimate the positions of the state, a liberal state, and when they speak they do so as state functionaries and this gives rise to very different dynamics and attitudes. That is why we are currently debating what to do, because we are likely to have another victory that the bourgeoisie will turn into our defeat, but this is not a problem just for Ecuadorians, it is also a problem for Bolivians and for Mexicans.”

Luis Macas himself has called on the CONAIE to “kick the electoral matrix to the curb.” But what is the alternative to the electoral system? According to the members of the CONAIE “A campaign that will politicize the elections that have become banal media spectacles.“ The reference here is to “The Other Campaign” or better to, “An-Other Campaign” in Ecuadorian-speak, but fully influenced by what Zapatismo has undertaken.
The indigenous movement has followed the Zapatistas “Other Campaign” with deep interest says Davalos and they consider this as an integral part of their own attempts to “decolonize and reconstruct their emancipatory discourse and practice.” In search of new paths, and after a long summary of bitter experiences, one lesson stands out, it is the lesson that has guided the CONAIE’s recent changes, “The movement can not be institutionalized, because if it is, it will die.”